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Political Violence, its Forms and Strategies in the  
First Austrian Republic [1982] 
Gerhard Botz ∗ 
Abstract: »Politische Gewalt – Formen und Strategien in der Ersten Republik Ös-
terreichs«. In this article, the author uses political violence, that is, the politically 
motivated physical damage human beings inflict on each other in any number of 
ways, as a lens to examine forms and patterns of extreme social conflict that 
emerged in the First Austrian Republic. In his analyses, the author uses quantita-
tive and qualitative analyses of violence by different political groups to determine 
the impact of social and economic factors, among others, on this violence. After 
an introduction this contribution deals with the quantitative changes in political 
violence between 1918 and 1934 and the qualitative changes in the structure of 
political conflict. After that the forms and patterns of political violence that 
emerged in this connection are described and some explicit strategies of violence 
by individual political groupings are given. Finally, the social causes of political 
violence are examined and provide new explanation of the breakdown of Aus-
trian democracy and the twofold civil war (in February and July) 1934. These 
events are not only a result of anti-democratic political decision making but 
also of the consequence of the rising waves of social conflicts and self-
enforcing violence. 
Keywords: Political violence, Revolution, National Socialism, First Republic, Austria. 
1.  Introduction 
This contribution deals with the concept of ‘political violence’ in so far as it con-
cerns actions whereby human beings inflict (forcible) physical damage – injuries or 
death – on each other.1 Political violence, in this context, is understood as one of the 
forms political and social conflicts may take in a given society. In a wide range of 
not-yet-violent methods for the articulation of interests and the settlement of con-
flicts, which vary according to conflict systems, violence represents the most ex-
treme means.2 It appears not merely in one area of conflict – such as politics and 
                                                             
∗  Reprint of: Gerhard Botz. 1982. Political Violence, its Forms and Strategies in the First 
Austrian Republic. In Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-
Century Europe, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, 300-29. London. 
1  Cf. K.-D. Knodel, 1962, Der Begriff der Gewalt im Strafrecht, Munich, 3; W. Fuchs, et al., 
eds., 1973, Lexikon zur Soziologie, Opladen, 247. 
2  Cf. for instance L. A. Coser, 1972, Theorie sozialer Konflikte, Neuwied, 142 et seq., 178 et seq.; 
A. L. Nieburg, 1969, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process, New York, 13; H. Davis Graham 
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government – but is systematically linked to many conflict systems, within families, 
the workplace and the economy. It is, however, a characteristic of violence that at 
certain levels, or when the ‘normal’ sequence of escalation is blocked, it can, 
through external influence, shift from one conflict system to another; this accounts 
for its multidimensional nature that makes it so difficult to pin down.3 Its study 
therefore also requires at least some examination of non-violent levels in the con-
duct of conflicts within a conflict system. 
Seen from this angle, it is clear that violence must always be examined in con-
junction with its (less active) counterpart in a given conflict. Thus political violence 
is not to be defined exclusively from the point of view of the modern state’s mo-
nopoly of violence. It includes not only the illegal actions by persons and groups4 in 
opposition to state and society, but also its use by the organs of the state. 
However desirable it might therefore appear to link the following deliberations 
on the subject – violence in the context of ‘striving for a share in the power or for 
an influence on the distribution of power [...] within a state’5 – with the wider histo-
ry of conflicts within Austrian society during the inter-war years, limitations of 
space and not least the present state of research into conflict,6 do not permit this. In 
the following I shall therefore attempt to steer a pragmatic course between too 
narrow and too comprehensive an approach. 
2.  The Quantitative Changes in Political Violence between 
1918 and 1934 and the Qualitative Changes in the 
Structure of Political Conflict 
No more practicable indicator of the actual extent of violence exists than the num-
ber of victims it claims. Their number also represents that yardstick of violence 
which enables us to compare and thus to quantify different forms of political vio-
lence – at least with regard to its extent, although not in relation to the public’s 
perception of violence, nor the degree of its deliberateness and thus moral reprehen-
sibility. In the following I shall merely examine the annual numbers of dead and 
                                                                                                                                
and T. R. Gurr, eds., 1969, The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Per-
spectives, New York; E. Zimmermann, 1977, Soziologie der politischen Gewalt, Stuttgart. 
3  More extensively treated in my contribution Formen und Intensität politisch-sozialer 
Konflikte in der Ersten und Zweiten Republik to the symposium Deux fois l'Autriche: Apres 
1918 et apres 1945, Rouen, November 8-12, 1977; Austriaca, 1979, Cahiers universitaires 
d'information sur l'Autriche 3: 428 et seq., as well as in my (unpublished) scenario Bed-
ingungen 'sozialen Friedens' und politischer Gewalt in Perioden wirtschaftlicher Krisen in 
Österreich (Institut für Konfliktforschung, Vienna, 1978) (a more comprehensive publication 
on this subject is being prepared for the Studienreihe Konfliktforschung, Vienna). 
4  T. Nardin, 1971, Violence and the State: A Critique of Empirical Political Theory, Beverly Hills 
and London, 66. 
5  M. Weber, 1964, in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. J. Winckelmann, 1042 et seq., Cologne. 
6  The most comprehensive and most recent publication on Austria: B. Marin, ed., 1979, 
Wachstumskrisen in Österreich?, vol. II: Szenarios, Vienna; cf. more generally also: Ges-
chichte und Gesellschaft 3 (1977), especially the contributions by Ch. Tilly and H. Volkmann. 
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seriously injured, which throughout the years under review remained at a fairly 
constant ratio of 1:3.7 A separate analysis of the different categories of physical 
injury would produce practically the same results. 
The line traced in Figure 1, by taking the number of victims (logarithmically 
transformed), shows the course of violence in Austria from 1919 to 1934.8 
Figure 1: The Course of Political Violence, Unemployment and Gross National 
Product (GNP) in the First Austrian Republic 
 
 
This shows that the years 1919 and 1920 (including the last quarter of 1918), with a 
total number of casualties ranging from 76 to 124, compared to the six years there-
after, stand out clearly as the period of ‘Austrian revolution.’9 This semi-
revolutionary period saw the political and national reshaping of Austria, within a 
social and political structure broken up by the aftermath of the World War; at the 
same time however, in social and economic terms, the shift of political weight from 
the traditional power elites of the Habsburg monarchy to the industrial working 
class and the independent peasants as well as later to the industrial bourgeoisie, was 
                                                             
7  See G. Botz, 1976, Gewalt in der Politik: Attentate, Zusammenstöße, Putschversuche, 
Unruhen in Österreich 1918-1934, Munich, 235 et seq. 
8  What argues for the use of the decadic logarithm in calculating annual casualty figures, 
increased by a factor of 1, are theoretical considerations (see also below, Section 5) and the 
demands imposed by the regression model (H. M. Blalock, Jr., 1972, Social Statistics, 2nd 
ed., Tokyo, 408 et seq.; K. Holm, ed., 1977, Die Befragung 5, Munich, 70 et seq., 124 et seq. 
9  O. Bauer, 1976, Die österreichische Revolution (1923) in Werkausgabe, vol. 2, ed. O. Bauer, 
489-865, Vienna. 
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only a limited one.10 After a brief period of dominance by the Social Democratic 
working class, the ‘Austrian revolution’ ended up in a kind of ‘balance of class 
forces.’11 
In the subsequent period of comparative internal stability, the political and social 
distribution of power that had been established in 1918/20 remained still relatively 
intact.12 Only once during the period up to 1926 – in 1923 – did the annual number 
of casualties of violence exceed 20. Compared to other periods of the First Republic 
these years thus appear relatively non-violent, although compared to the Second 
Republic they were distinctly violent. 
The 89 dead and at least 266 seriously injured during the workers’ unrest of 15 
July 1927 (the burning of the Palace of Justice),13 which led to a police massacre, 
mark the end of a state of comparative internal stability and of a still broadly even 
distribution of weight between the forces of Left and Right, before the first symp-
toms of the world economic crisis had even begun to be observed in Austria. 
Although in 1928 the stabilising forces within the political system once again 
appeared to gain the upper hand, the first signs of the world slump of 1929 set in 
train a process of progressive destabilisation and the appearance of fascist forces – 
first in the shape of Heimwehren (home defence units), and from 1932 onwards in 
the form of National Socialism and an increasing marginalisation of the Social 
Democratic workers’ movement.14 Despite considerable variations in the annual 
casualty figures (between 27 and 104), the years between 1929 and 1933 were 
characterised by a marked tendency towards increased political violence. In 1934, 
this period of latent civil war finally turned into temporary open civil war (the 
Schutzbund revolt of 12 February, with a total of 320 deaths, and the National 
Socialist putsch of 25 July, with a total of 269 deaths)15 and led to the replacement 
of a parliamentary-democratic system of political rule and control by a semi-fascist 
authoritarian one.16 
                                                             
10  Ibid., 743 et seq.; F. L. Carsten, 1973, Revolutionen in Mitteleuropa 1918/19, Cologne, 23 et 
seq. A comprehensive bibliography on this and the First Republic as a whole most recently, 
U. Kluge, 1978, Das Dilemma der Demokratie, Neue Politische Literatur 23: 219-47; cf. ge-
nerally also D. Lehnert, 1979, Die Epoche der Revolution am Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges 
1917-1920, (schriftliches) Referat auf der internationalen Tagung der Historiker der Arbei-
terbewegung, 15. Linzer Konferenz, Linz, September 11-15, 1979. 
11  O. Bauer, 1924, Das Gleichgewicht der Klassenkräfte, Der Kampf 17: 57-67. 
12  Cf. generally H. Hautmann and R. Kropf, 1978, Die österreichische Arbeiterbewegung vom 
Vormärz bis 1945, 3rd ed., Vienna, 125 et seq. 
13  See most recently: R. Neck and A. Wandruszka, eds., 1979, Die Ereignisse des 15. Juli 1927, 
Vienna. 
14  Cf. N. Leser, 1968, Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus, Vienna, 449 et seq.; H. 
Mommsen, 1979, Arbeiterbewegung und Nationale Frage, Göttingen, 345 et seq. 
15  K. R. Stadler, 1974, Opfer verlorener Zeiten, Vienna, 44; G. Jagschitz, 1976, Der Putsch: Die 
Nationalsozialisten in Österreich, Graz, 167; cf. also L. Jedlicka and R. Neck, eds., 1975, Das 
Jahr 1934: 12. Februar, Vienna; (eds), L. Jedlicka and R. Neck, eds., 1975, Das Jahr 1934: 25. Juli, 
Vienna. 
16  See E. Holtmann, 1978, Zwischen Unterdrückung und Befreiung: Sozialistische Ar-
beiterbewegung und autoritäres Regime in Österreich 1933-1938, Vienna, 42 et seq. 
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A breakdown of the statistics on victims of violence according to political affili-
ation indicates the dominant lines of conflict within Austrian society along which 
political violence tended to occur.17 Table 1 below shows the total numbers of 
victims for each year as well as the political groupings which were mainly involved 
in violent conflicts, according to their share in the overall annual casualty figures. 
The casualties suffered by the state’s organs of coercion are distributed among the 
various political and social ‘camps’ according to political weighting. 
Table 1: Annual Levels of Violence (Numbers of Victims) and Percentages 
According to Political Affiliation 
 No. of Victims Percentages According to Political Affiliations 
1918  
(from 12 Nov.)   9 (1) Marxists (78%); (2) Conservatives (22%) 
1919 124 (1) Left-wing radicals (52%); (2) Catholic-conservatives (12%); (3) Social democrats (11%) 
1920  76 (1) Social democrats (47%); (2) Communists (45%); (3) Catholic-conservatives (6%) 
1921   2 
Low incidence of violent conflicts 
1922   5 
1923  22 (1) Social democrats (36%); (2) Catholic-conservatives (32%) 
1924  10 
Low incidence of violent conflicts 1925   8 
1926   0 
1927 274 (1) Marxists (54%); (2) Catholic-conservatives (45%) 
1928   8 Low incidence of violent conflicts 
1929  77 (1) Heimwehr (66%); (2) Social democrats (25%) 
1930  40 (1) Heimwehr (40%); Social democrats (35%) 
1931  27 (1) Social democrats (44%); (2) Catholic conservatives and Heimwehr (30%); National Socialists (26%) 
1932 104 (1) National Socialists (42%); (2) Social democrats (22%); (3) Austro-fascist grouping18 (19%) 
1933   69 (1) Austro-fascist grouping (38%); (2) National Socialists (32%); (3) Social democrats (16%) 
1934  
(only Feb. 12 
and Jul. 25) 
56719 
(deaths 
only) 
(1) Austro-fascist grouping (39%); (2) Social democrats 
(35%); (3) National Socialists (25%) 
Source: G. Botz, 1975, Gewalt und politisch-gesellschaftlicher Konflikt in der Ersten Republik 
(1918 bis 1933), Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 4: 527. 
 
                                                             
17  On the modus of the breakdown see G. Botz, 1975, Gewalt und politisch-gesellschaftlicher 
Konflikt in der Ersten Republik (1918 bis 1933), Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwis-
senschaft 4: 526. 
18  'Austro-fascist' in this context is meant as a general designation of those political groupings 
that stood behind the Dollfuß government. On the term 'Austro-fascism' see in particular: 
W. Holzer, 1978, Faschismus in Österreich 1918-1938, Austriaca 1: 69-170. F. L. Carsten, 
1977, Faschismus in Österreich, Munich, 21 et seq. 
19  There exist only rough estimates as to the number of (seriously) injured, see Note 15. 
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Of the total figure of 859 victims of political violence (217 deaths and 642 serious 
injuries) for the period between 12 November 1918 and 11 February 1934, 16 per 
cent were Communists, 33 per cent Social Democrats, 15 per cent members of the 
Heimwehr and the Catholic-conservative ‘camp,’ 10 per cent National Socialists; 
the remainder were other civilians (6 per cent) and members of the state’s executive 
(20 per cent). 
3.  The Forms and Patterns of Political  
The annual variations in the levels of violence, set out in Table 1, broadly corre-
spond to the internal political conflict potential in general.20 The forms political 
violence took must therefore be seen against this background. 
Politically, the conflict constellation of the ‘Austrian revolution’ was, typically, 
a three-cornered one: left-wing radicals – Social-Democratic workers – catholic-
conservative bourgeoisie. In 1919 the main battle lines of violence ran between left-
wing radicals (mostly Communists) on the one hand, and Catholic-conservatives 
and Social Democrats, the coalition partners in the federal government, on the 
other. In 1920 the same conflict structure persisted, but was beginning to be super-
seded by a line-up of the middle class against Social Democrats and other left-wing 
forces. 
The type of violence associated with the largest number of victims during the 
‘Austrian revolution’ took the form of unrests with political or economic objectives, 
arising more or less spontaneously from demonstrations or offences against proper-
ty, with significant incidents of violence resulting as a rule only from police inter-
vention (as in the case of hunger demonstrations or price revolts in the winter and 
spring of 1919 and 1920 in Linz and Graz). A subsidiary branch of this type of 
violence were putschist actions – still of a spontaneous nature – by left-wing radi-
cals and Communists.21 The social base for such actions was provided in the main 
by the urban lower classes, particularly the unemployed, invalids and war veterans. 
Spontaneous unrests among the rural population, so-called ‘peasant revolts,’ on the 
other hand, involved considerably less violence.22 During the ‘Austrian revolution’ 
                                                             
20  On the absence of a social history of the Austrian Republic in the inter-war years see Ch. A. 
Gulick, 1976, Österreich von Habsburg zu Hitler, Vienna; H. Benedikt, ed., 1977, Geschichte 
der Republik Österreich, Vienna; K. R. Stadler, 1971, Austria, London; also G. Otruba, 1974, 
"Bauer" und "Arbeiter" in der Ersten Republik, Geschichte und Gesellschaft: Festschrift für 
Karl R. Stadler zum 60. Geburtstag, Vienna, 57-98; O. Leichter, 1964, Glanz und Elend der 
Ersten Republik, Vienna; B. Skotsberg, 1940, Der österreichische Parlamentarismus, Göte-
borg; K. Ausch, 1968, Als die Banken fielen, Vienna; see further literature also in P. Malina 
and G. Spann, 1978, Bibliographie zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte 1918-1978, Vienna. 
21  Botz, Gewalt, 44 et seq.; H. Hautmann, 1971, Die verlorene Räterepublik, 2nd ed., Vienna, 
145 et seq., 179 et seq.; J. Deutsch, 1921, Aus Österreichs Revolution, Vienna, 54 et seq. 
22  Carsten, Revolutionen, 252 et seq.; cf. also A. Staudinger, 1969, Die Ereignisse in den Län-
dern Deutschösterreichs im Herbst 1919, in Ende und Anfang, ed. L. Jedlicka, 78, Salzburg; E. 
R. Starhemberg, 1971, Memoiren, Vienna, 37 et seq.; A. Rintelen, 1941, Erinnerungen an Ös-
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these types of violence were intimately linked to acute shortages of food and con-
sumer goods and deficient social security provisions; thus their incidence, up to 
1921, tended to increase during the winter and spring quarters. 
Two less bloody forms of violent conflict were limited almost entirely to the first 
months of the ‘Austrian revolution’; once the climax of the revolutionary move-
ment had been passed by mid-1919, such actions also disappeared. One of them 
consisted in insults to officers and was mainly directed against members of the 
former imperial military apparatus, aristocrats and, to a lesser degree, industrialists; 
very rarely, however, did such attacks reach the degree of violence that might be 
described as serious bodily injury. Such acts, by small groups or individuals, often 
inflicting more symbolic and psychological than actual harm, were particularly 
frequent during the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian state apparatus in October and 
November 1918, an otherwise almost completely non-violent phase. During the 
power vacuum and the reshaping of the state’s structures that followed, somewhat 
bloodier conflicts began to set in between the members and formations of compet-
ing sectors of the state apparatus, either as an accompaniment to the dissolution of 
the Habsburg empire – where the exchanges of fire by troops belonging to the 
emergent nation states constituted in effect a transitional form of international 
violence – or in the course of the formation of the new ‘German-Austrian’ state, 
whose apparatus of coercion contained very different political persuasions.23 
The animosity between the gendarmerie and the federal police, who continued to 
be conservative-middle class in outlook, on the one hand, and the newly formed 
‘Marxist’ Volkswehr (people’s defence units) on the other, found its direct expres-
sion in occasional shoot-outs between the two, but also existed as a groundswell in 
mass disturbances when, during conflicts with the police, parts of the Volkswehr 
took the side of the civilian population. But even within the military apparatus itself 
the dissent between Communist-dominated sections of the armed forces (Rote 
Garde, Deutschmeister, Battailon Nr. 14) and the Social Democrat majority tended to 
break out openly, and frequently very bloodily, during insurrectionist actions by left-
wing radicals.24 Acts of violence such as the disruption of meetings or joint assaults 
on political adversaries still belong chronologically, though not genetically, to the 
final phase of the ‘Austrian revolution.’ In the beginning it was the Social Democrat 
and the Communist workers who were mainly responsible for these.25 The fact that 
their middle-class adversaries were able to come out with strong ‘anti-Marxist’ and 
anti-republican agitation – particularly during election campaigns – was a sign of the 
growing strength of counter-revolutionary forces. The Left, on the other hand, had few 
other means at its disposal beyond a barely organised but deliberate policy of forci-
ble intimidation by a relatively small number and this circumstance signalled the 
end of its being able to mobilise a revolutionary rank and file. It was only during 
                                                                                                                                
terreichs Weg, Munich, 40 et seq.; K. Schuschnigg, 1937, Dreimal Österreich, Vienna, 67; 
more generally also Botz, Gewalt, 22-86 (on the following also ibid., 87-280). 
23  L. Jedlicka, 1955, Ein Heer im Schatten der Parteien, Graz, 16. 
24  Deutsch, Österreichs Revolution, 33 et seq., 47 et seq., 110 et seq. 
25  Cf. for instance J. Deutsch, 1923, Die Faschistengefahr, Vienna, 12 et seq.; L. Kunschak, 
1952, Steinchen vom Wege, Vienna, 78 et seq.; Rintelen, Erinnerungen, 106, 110 et seq. 
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the next stage, the period of collision, that this particular form of political violence 
became the germinating cell for the prevalent type of violence. 
If we summarise the most important trends in violence during the ‘Austrian rev-
olution,’ we can say that the increasingly revolutionary movement of the rank and 
file, until it reached its climax in the spring of 1919, had achieved its remarkable 
(but by no means total) political and social successes by nonviolent or relatively 
non-violent means. Within a few weeks after the start of the ‘Austrian revolution,’ 
the impact of revolutionary ideas had already begun to lessen; at the same time, 
however, rank-and-file support became both more radical and more narrowly based. 
Correspondingly, there was a trend towards a decline in mass support and spontane-
ity, and a greater degree of planning and organisation of violent conflicts, coupled 
with an increase in the danger of the weapons used. Numerous spontaneous forms 
of violence, difficult to categorise in party-political terms and usually directed 
against property, nevertheless remained a phenomenon of this period and disap-
peared only gradually. In inverse proportion to this, the executive’s harshness in the 
repression of violence directed against the system grew. 
The period of relative stability brought no change in the ‘anti-Marxist’-‘Marxist’ 
pattern of conflict, although until 1926 this remained at a relatively low level of 
violence. Left-wing radicalism had disappeared almost completely and become 
merged into the Social Democratic movement, which had meanwhile taken on the 
role of parliamentary opposition; and within the two ‘middle-class’ camps-
Catholic-conservatives and anti-clerical German-Nationalists – the fascist threat to 
the parliamentary democratic system had not yet become a force in its own right. 
Even the climax of the stability crisis in 1923, following the inflationary upheavals 
of 1922, led only to a quantitative increase but not to a qualitative change in this 
balance of conflict. The same holds true even for the year 1927, although it was 
completely overshadowed by the July disturbances that took on dimensions little 
short of civil war and is usually considered to have been the turning point in Aus-
tria’s internal political development during the inter-war era. 
Soon after the beginning of the period of relative stability, new forms of vio-
lence came into being, or more accurately forms that had been developed from 
types of violence seen earlier. A series of individual acts of violence that now fol-
lowed represented without doubt a new type of political violence in the Austrian 
Republic, which no later period in Austrian history was to see again in this accumu-
lated form: acts such as the Nazi Feme murder of a young member of a National-
Socialist secret society in 1923, the attempt on the life of the Christian-Socialist 
Federal Chancellor, Ignaz Seipel, by a Social Democrat worker in 1924, the murder 
of a liberal Jewish author by a Nazi fanatic in 1925, the attempt on the life of the 
Social Democrat Mayor of Vienna, Karl Seitz, in 1927 by a psychopath under the 
influence of a right-wing radical ‘war veterans’ association.’ These and a number of 
other acts of violence, of less far-reaching consequences, were closely connected 
either with the desperate economic situation or the more or less marked mental 
anomaly of their perpetrators. A direct link with political organisations and their 
specific strategies of violence in these cases is only evident where the perpetrators 
were National-Socialists. 
A specific form of violence already referred to as taking the form of disrupting 
meetings or joint assaults – developed towards the end of the ‘Austrian revolution’ 
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and initially practised mainly by the Left – evolved into the typical form of violence 
of all subsequent pre-civil war periods: the street brawl between unequally organised 
political adversaries, or the armed clash. This type had arisen out of the following 
circumstances: the emergence of ‘anti-Marxist,’ anti-democratic radical minorities, 
against whom the ‘Marxist’ workers, in the face of state authorities increasingly sym-
pathetic to the Right, were forced to resort to ‘self-help’ violence; the minorities, in 
their turn, developed self-defence cadres, organised on strict military lines and 
armed with firearms and during meetings and demonstration marches very soon 
ceased to operate in a purely defensive manner and instead, in anticipation of at-
tacks from the Left, took the offensive and resorted to extreme means of violence 
and the use of firearms. This constellation resulted in fierce clashes, at first more by 
accident than design, between the unequal partners in the conflict, with casualties, 
up to 1927, usually being incurred by the Left.26 
The causes at work in the case of the workers’ unrests of 15 July 1927 in Vien-
na, however, were different. Their complex further development into a general strike, 
traffic blockades and, in the western and southern regions of the Federation,27 sections 
of the Federal Army and the Heimwehren preparing themselves to fight a civil war 
need not be gone into here. The start of the events of 15 July 1927 in Vienna thus 
appears as a clash between two uncoordinated violent strategies of threat and repres-
sion, the one represented by the Social Democrats’ tactics of relatively non-violent, 
mass street demonstrations, the other by police tactics; the latter, as a result of the shift 
in political power since 1918/19, were now able to operate with more vigour, albeit no 
better prepared organisationally than before, against disturbances of law and order 
from the ‘Left.’28 After a typical process of escalation between initially non-violent 
demonstrators and the police, Austria stood within a few hours at the brink of a civil 
war – a development which was prevented mainly by the retreat of the Social-
Democratic party leadership, a step that was to lead to its eventual political defeat. 
As an exceptional case in the history of Austria since 1848, should be noted the 
murder caused by the lynching of a young Christian-Democrat gymnast by some 
members of the Viennese Prater sub-culture, who broke away from an ‘anti-fascist’ 
street meeting – an incident that throws some light on the extent of latent political 
tensions as early as 1925. 
Compared with the ‘revolutionary period’ and the latent civil war that was to 
come, the interim phase, apart from its opening and closing years, showed a remarka-
ble consistency in the forms of violence employed, a fact which might be taken to 
indicate that political conflicts had not yet taken on a self-generating dynamism strong 
                                                             
26  G. Botz, 1973, Bewaffnete Zusammenstöße und Strategie des frühfaschistischen Terrors in 
Österreich, Teil 1 und IL, Archiv. Mitteilungsblatt des Vereins der Geschichte für Arbeiterbe-
wegung: 41-50, 58-68. 
27  Kriegsarchiv Wien, Bundesheer, 1927; Assistenzberichte; L. Jedlicka and R. Neck, eds., 1973, 
Österreich 1927 bis 1938, Vienna, 31 et seq. 
28  Akten der Untersuchungskommission des Wiener Gemeinderates, Allg. Verwaltungsarchiv 
Wien, Christl.-soz. Partei Wien, box 16; R. Danneberg, 1927, Die Wahrheit über die 'Polizei-
aktion' am 15. Juli, Vienna; Ausschreitungen in Wien am 15. und 16. Juli 1927: Weißbuch, 
Vienna: Polizeidirektion, 1927. 
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enough not to be coped with by the stabilising elements within society – always pre-
supposing the absence of external disturbances. 
Although the relative calm of 1928, in terms of violence, still appeared to be un-
touched either by the events surrounding the 15 July 1927, which deeply polarised 
public opinion, or by the accelerated rise of the Heimwehr movement, there now set in 
an almost unbreakable sequence of violent events that marked the period from 1928 to 
1933 as one of latent civil war, which in 1934 finally turned into a state of open civil 
war. Already by 1929, the first signs of the world economic crisis had led to a signifi-
cant sharpening of the existing conflict structure, and within the Catholic-conservative 
‘camp’ the Heimwehr now began to be a politically dominant and increasingly in-
dependent auxiliary force. And in 1930 too, Austrian domestic politics were over-
shadowed by the, violent conflict between middle-class and ‘Austro-Marxism.’ 
The year 1931, however, saw the beginnings of a remarkable shift in the political 
battle fronts, as National Socialists joined the side of the Catholic-conservative, 
Heimwehr-fascist grouping in the struggle against ‘Marxism.’ Shortly before the 
world economic crisis had reached its climax, the year 1932 showed very clearly 
how profoundly the constellation of conflict had changed: the strongest enmity now 
existed between NSDAP and the so-called System-Parteien (parties supporting the 
state) with the Social Democratic Party continuing to carry the main burden of the 
battle against the German version of Fascism, while itself still caught up in a state 
of conflict with the Heimwehr (and the rest of the Catholic-conservative ‘camp’). In 
1933 the same main battle lines continued to exist, the only difference being that 
the weight of the anti-Nazi struggle had now shifted to the conservative, semi-
fascist government ‘camp,’ leaving untapped the powers of resistance of the Social 
Democrats, whom Chancellor Dollfuß had manoeuvred into a political corner. 
In the civil war year of 1934, the same triangular conflict situation persisted. As 
we can see from Table 1, the government ‘camp’ came first in the league table of 
violence. This was the result of its double involvement in a civil-warlike struggle, 
first from 12-14 February with parts of the ‘Marxist camp’ and then from 25-9 July 
with the Austrian National Socialists. 
Apart from individual acts of violence which continued to occur sporadically 
(such as a Communist and a Nazi Feme murder in 1931 and 1932 respectively) as 
well as the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuß in 1934 and the armed attack on the 
Heimwehr leader Richard Steidle by the National Socialists in 1933), the period of 
latent civil war once more shows typical forms of violence. The armed clashes now 
indicated a more even match between adversaries than had been the case previously, 
since the ‘Marxist’ side had now adapted its organisation, tactics and armament to its 
adversaries on the Right. Instead of groups of workers operating relatively spontane-
ously, there now emerged the militarily well-organised Republikanische Schutzbund 
(republican defence league).29 Clashes became more frequent, indeed were quite 
often provoked deliberately, they led to severe physical injury and occasionally, just 
as earlier in 1929 in the Styrian village of St. Lorenzen, turned into pitched street 
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battles. Increasingly, the state’s forces of order were dragged into the conflict, as for 
instance during the bloody clash in the Viennese district of Simmering in 1932.30 
The attempted putsch by the Styrian, the German Nationalist wing of the Heim-
wehren on 13 September 1931, represented a further notable form of violence that 
played an important role during this period, even though this attempt was confined 
to a single incident.31 The military staff exercises and the preparations carried out 
by the Heimwehren, but equally the Republikanische Schutzbund’s defensive prepa-
rations, from 1928 onwards had gone in the direction of this form of violence. The 
Austrian Heimwehr-fascists frankly admitted that the ‘march on Rome’ had served 
them as a model for this.32 
When it appeared probable that the NSDAP would be made illegal, the year 
1933 brought a further form of violence into the political battle field, hitherto un-
known in Austrian history: systematic bomb terror. Its objectives ranged from 
purely demonstrative purposes to deliberately lethal attacks.33 During the months of 
impending illegality and also after the NSDAP had been proscribed as a party, this 
particular form of violence replaced the other most frequent one so far, i.e. clashes 
between paramilitarily organised private armies. 
The logical final stage of latent civil war came with the two outbreaks of battles 
between the three ‘camps,’ each lasting several days and involving large numbers 
of people. In formal terms, both civil wars show a certain resemblance: both cases 
were a mixture of spontaneity and long-term planning, of a high and a low level of 
organisation. In both cases, when the fighting began, an already proscribed paramil-
itary formation stood at the centre of the action. Yet there were also significant 
differences. The rather broad participation of the SA in the Austrian regions in July 
1934 is thus to be regarded merely as the (unplanned) consequence of the SS’s 
operations in Vienna, which followed the classical pattern of a military putsch. The 
participation of the ‘Marxist’ workers’ movement in the attempted insurrection of 
the Upper-Austrian Republikanische Schutzbund in February 1934, on the other 
hand, which would have been necessary to provide the required backing, did not 
occur to the extent the insurgents had hoped for.34 In typological terms, the 12 
February 1934 ought thus to be seen as a defensive insurrection attempt, the 25 July 
1934, on the other hand, as a putschist attempt to seize power. 
Looking at the period between 1918 and 1934 as a whole, one finds that the 
groups in opposition to the system were usually also the ones most strongly in-
volved in violent conflicts, for they, in trying to assert their social objectives, pos-
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sessed few non-violent alternative means. Thus, from a position of weakness, they 
tended to take the offensive and resort to violence, only to be regarded as a serious 
threat by the social groupings controlling the state and to be held down all the more 
repressively by them. 
Table 2 below provides a systematic listing of the most significant forms of vio-
lence which occurred in the First Republic, according to the number of participants 
(or duration of violence) and the conflicting parties’ degree of organisation. 
Acts of violence committed by individuals or very small groups, especially the 
merely structured or amorphous forms, were a feature throughout the entire period 
of the First Republic, even though the frequency of their incidence tended to vary. 
The ‘Austrian revolution’ was characterised in particular by forms of violence 
which, while involving mass participation, were marked by little or no organisation. 
The period of relative political equilibrium saw forms of violence with every 
level of participation; the less they were organised, the greater the number who took 
part and, conversely, the more highly organised they were, the smaller the circle of 
participants. The period of latent civil war, typically, showed highly organised 
forms of violence at all levels of participation. 
Table 2: Forms of Political Violence in Austria 1918-34 
Number of participants: Few (-5) Many (-500) Very many (500+) 
Duration of violence: short medium long 
Degree of organisation 
organised Assassination 
Feme-murder 
Bomb-terror 
Clash Coup d’état Putsch 
structured Assault 
Clash Clash 
Putschist action 
Insurrection 
amorphous Insults 
Political brawls Lynching 
Riot 
Unrests 
 
The state authorities, as a rule, were the immediate target only of the forms of vio-
lence involving many participants; both workers and the urban lower classes, but 
also the peasants, were particularly active in mass violence of little or no organisa-
tion. Participation by the very young or the ‘middle class,’ on the other hand, is a 
characteristic feature of all variants of organised individual violence, and this also 
corresponds to the prevalence of National Socialists in this type of violence. 
In sociographical terms, the supporters of predominantly organised or structured 
forms of violence, ranging from a few to large numbers of participants, may be 
described in a rather compressed form as follows: 
Over-represented among the supporters of political violence (in comparison to 
society as a whole and also to the non-‘militants’ within the individual ‘camps’) are 
urban and metropolitan youths and young men (under thirty), particularly in the 
case of the National Socialists, to a lesser degree in that of the Social Democrats. 
Because of the conflicting parties’ paramilitary forms of organisation, women and 
girls are involved in this type of violence only in exceptional instances. 
Particularly disposed towards violence also were the members of groups not (or 
not yet) firmly incorporated into working life, and therefore with the necessary time 
and mobility to take part in political violence, i.e. especially the unemployed, war 
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veterans, invalids (and adolescents). The ‘lower’ strata of almost all social classes 
and groups, who appear as ‘representative’ for these classes or groups as a whole, 
appear to be particularly predisposed to political violence: students and youngsters 
in secondary education representing the liberal professions and civil servants, the 
sons of peasants, tradesmen and merchants deputising for their fathers, unskilled 
workers and apprentices for skilled workers and craftsmen. Workers in general are 
more numerous among the ‘militants’ than among the simple members of the indi-
vidual ‘camps.’ 
The generation of former soldiers, who had fought in the First World War as 
very young men, especially officers and non-commissioned officers, provided an 
important reservoir for the supporters of violence.35 
4.  Explicit Strategies of Violence by Individual Political 
Groupings 
As may be seen from the previous section, violence appears often associated with 
political radicalism and social fringe groups. Indeed, for violence on any scale 
between political and social ‘camps’ to occur at all, it requires a prior process of 
political marginalisation of at least one of the political ‘camps’ involved. This 
conclusion may be drawn from the Communists’ putschist actions on the Maundy 
Thursday of 1919 and on 15 June 1919, but equally from the two outbreaks of civil 
war in 1934. 
According to the three Tilly’s,36 the causes for this must be sought in the follow-
ing facts: for a powerful group, which, if it deserves this attribute, also stands in 
close relation to the apparatus of rule, active use of violence is hardly worthwhile. 
The incidental social costs of (direct) violence very frequently exceed its immediate 
usefulness, unless those in power are confronted by a serious challenge to their 
position. The converse holds true for groups which are either far removed from 
power or without it altogether, since, firstly, the signalling effect attaching to the use 
of violence, or being turned into the victim of violence, may evoke hidden sympathies 
or support from sections of the established power groups, and secondly, because those 
with little power have very few alternative courses of legal action open to them; con-
sequently, the probability of coming to violence by way of illegality is great and – in 
view of the state’s threat of sanctions – causes them to drift even further from the 
socially accepted rules of the political game. Finally, purposeful and bloody terrorism 
may well strengthen the power position of groups with little power, by discrediting the 
power of the government, especially in areas where the latter already suffers from a 
power vacuum, as was the case in the First Austrian Republic. 
This general framework needs to be borne in mind when turning, as we do now, 
to the explicit strategies of violence developed by political parties and movements 
in Austria between 1918 and 1934. We may be unable to reach more than provi-
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sional conclusions, but this is inevitable, given the absence of any appropriate 
analyses that go beyond the mere examination of programmatic or theoretical decla-
rations. 
First of all we have to consider one strategy of violence which, while highly de-
veloped in practice, tended to be too easily overlooked, that is to say, the strategy and 
tactics in the deployment of the state’s forces of order, especially the police. An actual 
or anticipated infraction of ‘law and order,’ which by definition should precede any 
action by the police, would seem to impose a reactive strategy on the state in the 
exercise of its monopoly of coercion; this, however, was (and still is) not always the 
case. Yet even reactive strategies in the deployment of the police, and particularly the 
threshold where violence sets in, show a very broad range of variation, according to 
specific cultural particularities or the composition of the ruling social groupings and 
classes. Thus the police strategies vis-a-vis disturbances of order from Left or Right 
respectively varied considerably.37 
As long as the state apparatus was still weak and the revolutionary movement un-
specific but broadly based – which was the case until around April 1919 – the execu-
tive’s response to spontaneous disturbances, even in cases of deliberate political in-
fractions of law and order (such as setting fire to the parliament building on 17 April 
1919) and during lethal attacks on the police, was a careful and defensive protection 
of property coupled with peaceful persuasion. The employment of Social Demo-
cratic leaders and of soldiers’ and workers’ councils to mediate, and to legitimise 
the means of violence deployed made it possible to settle even critical situations 
with little or no violence. By means of this strategy, Vienna’s (German Nationalist) 
chief of police Schober was able to establish his reputation as a man of ‘order,’ 
which later gave him access to the highest political offices. Even after the ‘revolu-
tionary’ constellation of power had ceased to exist, Schober’s police apparatus still 
tended to exercise restraint in the use of extreme measures. 
Once the revolutionary movements had lost some of its breadth, but had gained 
in Bolshevik direction and radicalism that posed a threat to the system and also 
brought it into conflict with large sections of Social Democratic opinion, the police 
practices changed. Both during the Communist’s putschist action of 15 June 1919 
in Vienna and during hunger and inflation disturbances in the provincial capitals in 
1920 they were given fairly indiscriminate orders to clear the streets and to shoot. 
When the events of 15 July 1927 escalated into the burning of the Palace of Justice 
and involved considerable loss of life (almost exclusively among civilians) this was 
due, at least to some extent, to an extremely forceful if uncoordinated and patchy 
deployment of the police with mounted and armed men. 
The consequence of this trial of strength, which ended in a victory for the ‘middle-
class’ government side, was that henceforth the executive’s strategy against the Left 
became increasingly ruthless, while its attitude to threats to the constitution from the 
Right was one, if not of open cooperation, at least of compliance and tolerance. Thus, 
different strategies of repression and control were employed which varied according 
to the political and social origins of the disturbers of law and order. 
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The Austrian Communists’ strategy of violence manifested itself during their 
spontaneous putschist actions of 17 April and 15 June, 1919 in Vienna. The earlier 
charge by ‘Red Guards’ on the parliament building, on the occasion of the proclama-
tion of the Republic on 12 November 1918, already linked part of the left-wing radical 
movement-which at this stage still included the Bolshevik element that emerged only 
later as a separate entity – with putschist efforts. This concept of testing their strength 
by violence had the following background. 
Its starting point was (of course) Lenin’s successful revolutionary theory, partic-
ularly the notion that in a ‘revolutionary situation’ objective and subjective factors 
come together: for a revolution to take place, objective social elements (the weakening 
of the existing system of rule, increased distress among the masses, greater political 
mobilisation) would have to coincide with subjective ones. These subjective factors, 
which depended on human will, would find their expression especially in the work-
ing class’s capacity for revolutionary mass action, under Communist party leader-
ship.38 Thus the ‘correct’ degree of consciousness and organisation were decisive 
elements, if a revolutionary change of power was to become a reality. 
A large section of the Austrian Communists took the view in 1918/19, with some 
justification, that such a ‘revolutionary situation’ did indeed exist and that it required 
only minimal assistance in the form of agitation and organisation to set the powder 
keg alight. A temporary intake of people made ‘rootless’ by the Great War and its 
aftermath was claimed to have increased the Austrian Communist Party’s membership 
to around 40,000 by May 1919, the highest figure recorded throughout the period of 
the First Republic.39 This appeared to confirm the revolutionary perspective, as did 
also the proclamation of a republic of councils in both Hungary and Bavaria. 
The spontaneous version of the Communists’ putsch strategy now consisted in 
calling simultaneous meetings in different parts of Vienna and, if these meetings 
proved successful in terms of attendance and atmosphere, to issue orders for an 
immediate march on the parliament building in the city’s centre, there to state their 
socio-political demands in the form of an ultimatum and to call for the immediate 
establishment of a republic of councils. Beyond the wave of excitement engendered 
by several thousand demonstrators, this also required support from units of the 
Volkswehr (people’s defence units). Communist agitators therefore appeared in 
army barracks, seeking to arouse enthusiasm for their cause among Social Demo-
cratic soldiers and workers. These efforts were to result in the overthrow of the 
government, or at least lead to its reconstruction, and the elimination of the Social 
Democrats’ bourgeois coalition partners. 
Ernst Bettelheim, who had been sent from Hungary to revolutionise Austria, fur-
nished with dictatorial powers over the Communist Party, after his arrest by the 
police made the following statement: 
[…] that the Communists (at any moment)40 consider the proclamation of a repub-
lic of councils to be desirable, and that the question as to whether any demonstra-
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tion may result in such a proclamation can only be answered during the demonstra-
tion itself, according to the will of the masses who participate in the same, and ac-
cording to the prevailing balance of forces.41 
As early as April 1919, the Communist organisation repeatedly attempted to drive 
the ‘mass of the proletariat’ towards revolution. However, the Communist function-
aries had either misread the political situation or been guilty of organisational mis-
takes, for at the critical moment a large part of the working population refused to 
follow them. An attempted storming of the parliament building and exchanges of fire, 
although without mass participation, created the impression of a putsch. A Communist 
workers’ council found the ‘classical’ formulation for this type of strategy: ‘What 
today is called a putsch, will, if successful, be a revolution tomorrow.’42 
Another form of Communist putschism shows a marked resemblance to the 
Blanquist concept of insurgence: when the attempted overthrow of April 1919 
failed and the Hungarian government of councils came under increasing pressure 
from abroad, Hungarian emissaries redoubled their efforts to force a political 
change in Austria. This brought their financially extremely well-endowed cadre 
organisation into conflict with sections of Communist opinion back home. Un-
daunted, even though the police, backed by the Social Democrats, carried out pre-
ventive arrests, a hard core around Bettelheim nevertheless tried to use the not 
unfavourable mood among soldiers, threatened by an impending reduction in their 
numbers, in order to carry out their plan. This attempt, which started on 15 June 
1919, found its bloody conclusion under a hail of police bullets. In one of the bar-
racks a central authority had been established to direct military operations of sec-
tions of the Volkswehr that had been originally envisaged but never came to pass. 
Military staff exercises on the deployment of the Hungarian Red Army against 
Vienna may have played a role as well. 
As soon as the revolutionary tide ebbed towards the middle of 1919, revolutionary 
expectations began to collapse rapidly. For a time, Communist splinter groups turned 
their attentions to the blowing up of a railway bridge (the so-called Lumpi-cowp) and 
to obtaining money by breaking into shops and churches43 as a curious precursor to 
the politically motivated bank raids of recent times. 
In the years that followed, the Communist Party was never again able to develop 
its own strategy of violence. Realistically, it could only direct its activities towards 
mobilising other, stronger proletarian forces and foster armed clashes that might end 
in an insurrection by Social Democrats, as was indeed attempted on 15 July 1927 and 
after the clash on 16 October 1932 at Simmering.44 
The Social Democrats’ strategy of violence flowed from their party’s reformism 
which, while attentist in character, was nevertheless based on principles of socialist 
reconstruction. While the majority of the Party did not reject violence as a political 
instrument in principle, it nevertheless wished to restrict it to a merely defensive 
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function. Even the ominous formulation in the ‘Linz Programme’ of 1926, which 
spoke of breaking the ‘bourgeoisie’s resistance with the instruments of a dictatorship,’ 
ought to be understood as a mainly defensive statement, intended in effect to force 
the bourgeois side to keep to the democratic rules, in case it should prove unwilling 
to give up political power peacefully, once the Social Democrats had won their 
expected overwhelming election victory.45 
This strategy was also imposed on the Republikanische Schutzbund, founded in 
1923 as the supposed armed executive organ of the Socialist ‘camp.’ Ever since the 
end of the ‘Austrian revolution’ the Social Democrats, after all, had had sound 
reasons for not believing the state apparatus to be absolutely reliable when it came 
to repulsing counter-revolutionary stratagems, monarchist putsch attempts, the 
influences of Bavarian and Hungarian right-wing extremists, etc. In these circum-
stances, the party leadership felt constrained to turn the ‘proletariat’s fighting fit-
ness’ into the reality of a counter-army – and this was precisely what the Schutz-
bund developed into after 1927. Strict military discipline, uniforms, weapon 
training, military staff exercises, the establishment of arms depots, etc., turned this 
organisation, which originally had been opposed to militarism, into a militarist one. 
This also meant that its strategy of violence began to resemble that of its opponents 
more closely. 
Theodor Körner, a former general and the Social Democrats’ defence expert, de-
nounced this development in the sharpest terms and at an early stage predicted its 
consequences: it would have a soporific effect on the Socialist ‘camp’s’ will to 
fight, compress in an undifferentiated way their various opponents into a single 
enemy image, produce an almost exclusive reliance on violent means, in the use of 
which the Social Democrats, despite their numerical superiority, would nevertheless 
always remain inferior to their opponents. Körner’s suggestion to take account in 
their military concept of the possibility of mobilising the entire working population 
politically and of spontaneous passive resistance went unheeded, as did his exhorta-
tion to try every means available within a parliamentary, democratic constitutional 
state before resorting to defensive violence.46 
In effect, the Schutzbund increasingly had its fighting methods imposed upon it 
by others, especially the Heimwehr’s strategy of marches, developed towards the 
end of the 1920s. From 1928 onwards, several thousand Schutzbund members 
tested and demonstrated ‘the proletariat’s readiness to defend itself, in large-scale 
manoeuvres and marches virtually every Sunday. It was in the nature of things that 
this led to collisions with the Heimwehr’s opposing strategies and frequently ended 
in bloodshed. The Schutzbund, at least, cannot be accused of directly provoking 
clashes on any scale, a charge which might with justification be levelled against its 
opponents. 
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It was, however, not by accident that the military spirit within the Schutzbund 
prompted a modification of the conditions governing the use of violence – in order 
to prevent a legal takeover of government after a Social Democratic election victo-
ry. The Schutzbund leadership around Alexander Eifler and Julius Deutsch took the 
view that the Schutzbund would have to counter right-wing efforts to establish a 
dictatorship even before the Social Democrats had gained a parliamentary majority. 
As early as 1928, they reckoned with the ever-present possibility of a civil war 
breaking out for whatever reason.47 
If there existed deviations from stated theoretical principles contained in the par-
ty programme of 1926 amongst the leadership of its paramilitary organisation, these 
were bound to be very much more marked and less differentiated among the rank and 
file.48 What tended to happen in the day-to-day practice of political conflict – dur-
ing the ‘class struggle with pitchforks’ (K. Renner)49 – was precisely what Otto 
Bauer, referring to the ‘Linz Programme,’ had warned against: ‘Violence does not 
mean a street brawl!’ The defensive strategy of violence degenerated into partially 
offensive tactics of brawling. An example of this sort of thing is provided by the 
following report in a Social Democratic daily paper: 
Our Republikanischer Schutzbund of course was not content merely with prevent-
ing a scheduled meeting (of War Veterans), but decided to carry out a proper raid. 
So they broke up the lair of War Veterans in the ‘Königswieser’ pub [...] and scat-
tered the whole bunch of them. They also took a look at the National Socialists’ 
pub at the ‘Grüne Baum’ [...] Their thorough cleaning-up operation extends, of 
course, to the whole of Upper Austria.50 
Even if some of this is merely verbal radicalism, the strategy of weakening and 
intimidating opponents by breaking up meetings and raiding the party venues of right-
wing radicals did not stop short of active use of violence. The fact that the party lead-
ership not only knew that their theoretical concepts were being bent, but indeed made 
occasional deliberate use of a dual political strategy, was proved by the momentous 
failure of this very strategy on 15 July 1927: using the rank and file to exert pres-
sure on political opponents by stormy demonstrations, ‘violence against property’ 
and structured or amorphous forms of personal violence,51 while as a party leader-
ship pursuing a moderate course, recoiling from the consequences of their own 
policies. Much as the middle-class and fascist propaganda polemicised against the 
red peril, men like Seipel and Dollfuß, by contrast, were perfectly able to see 
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through this game and to calculate unyieldingly and successfully the risks attaching 
to their own policies.52 
For a long time the middle-class Catholic-conservative ‘camp’ did not develop 
its own strategies of violence. Ever since the foundation of the Republic, at first 
timidly and later with growing self-assurance, it had entertained close relations with 
virtually all levels of the state apparatus, the only exception being the Viennese mu-
nicipal and regional administrations. The state’s executive, or at least sections of it, 
had always been at its disposal. This may create the impression that this ‘camp’ had a 
strictly legalistic orientation throughout. No doubt, quite a few middle-class politi-
cians recoiled from an open break with legality, even at a time when, as in the early 
1930s, notions about ‘true democracy,’ ‘the authoritarian state,’ undemocratic, dicta-
torial forms of government had already gained strong currency also among Chris-
tian-Socialists (and German-Nationalists). This is not to say, however, that the same 
group of politicians had not already in 1920, in cooperation with Hungarian coun-
ter-revolutionaries, entertained serious plans for the overthrow of a coalition gov-
ernment that gave them only a half-share of power.53 At various times in later years 
as well, plans for a coup d’etat played an important role among large sections of the 
middle-class parties. When Dollfuß set aside parliamentary democracy in March 
1933, this constituted in effect a sort of ‘cold’ coup d’etat, carried out by stages.54 
In the day-to-day political skirmishing of the inter-war period, however, this 
‘camp’ did employ auxiliary troops which operated outside the law and used violent 
means: the early Heimwehr formations, the monarchist Ostara, the ‘War Veterans’ 
Association’ etc., were without exception proto- or semi-fascist organisations. If 
these were able to operate as independently, as the heterogeneous collection of 
organisations that had come together in the Heimwehr had been able to do since 
1927, and to build up their own party organisations, the essential criteria for a fas-
cist movement were in effect already met. 
These right-wing radical- and, later on, blatantly fascist-formations had already 
in the early 1920s practised an offensive version of the Social Democrats’ defensive 
strategy of violence, especially in those regions of Austria where they could com-
mand a broad social base.55 This indicates a constant interplay between the Left’s 
and the Right’s strategies of violence, which determined their further development. 
The Schutzbund later copied this strategy, thus provoking in its turn a further mobi-
lisation of its opponents and a general exacerbation of the climate of violence. The 
fact that right-wing radical and fascist formations had taken the lead, at least initially, 
in the deadliness of their weapons and the readiness of their use explains why the 
casualties until 1927, as we have seen earlier, were so unevenly distributed among 
the warring factions. 
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As time went on, the Heimwehr developed – not least under the influence of Ital-
ian fascists and Hungarian reactionaries – a strategy of mass marches designed 
systematically to encircle ‘Red Vienna’ and other citadels of Social Democracy, 
and make them ripe for a takeover, along the lines of the Italian model. Such a 
provocative display of Heimwehr formations in the middle of industrial centres and 
working class districts (with the blessings of the Catholic clergy and the protection 
of the state authorities), tightening their formations in ever closer circles around 
Vienna, meant a symbolic breaking of the ‘Reds’ monopoly of the street,’ and with 
it a psychological weakening of the ‘Austro-Marxists.’ The latter did indeed per-
ceive it in this way. Yet when the Social Democrats took up the challenge and 
deployed their Schutzbund, it often required only a minor incident for shooting and 
violent street-fighting to break out. Virtually every Sunday during the late 1920s 
saw, by now almost automatic, collisions between marchers and counter-marchers 
especially in the industrial regions of Upper Styria and Lower Austria. 
A planned putsch attempt by the Heimwehr may well have taken this automatic 
triggering of violence into account. Sections of the middle-class parties, for all their 
sympathy with the Heimwehr, were nevertheless hostile to the idea of the latter 
establishing a dictatorship. For this reason, many Heimwehr-leaders, as well as 
some of their Christian-Socialist backers (such as Anton Rintelen in Styria) hoped 
that by provoking clashes with the Schutzbund they might tempt the latter into 
larger-scale hostilities or even an attempted coup d’état. This in turn was to be 
answered by a counter-blow from the Heimwehr, acting in conjunction with police 
and army. The expected defeat of the ‘reds’ was thus to lead to a reconstruction of 
Austria on fascist lines, unfettered by any constitutional constraints. 
This was also the political background to street fights such as the one at St Lo-
renzen of 18 August 1929. On these occasions the Schutzbund acted with restraint, 
while on the Christian-Socialist side there were reasonable men as well who were able 
to curb the hotheads within their own and the Heimwehr ranks. Without the active 
participation of the state executive, most of the Heimwehr leaders did not in any 
case feel strong enough to attempt a putsch.56 When the leader of the radical, pro-
Nazi Styrian Heimatschutz (home defence), Walter Pfrimer, fearing a possible 
defeat of the Austrian variant of fascism that was the Heimwehr decided, on 13 
September 1931, to bring about a ‘march on Vienna’ after all, his attempt failed mis-
erably in the face of the Schutzbund counter-measures and the army’s initial neu-
trality and subsequent hesitant intervention.57 
The thesis that the Schutzbund’s attempted insurrection of February 1934 had 
been deliberately provoked by the Heimwehr remains a matter of heated controver-
sy among scholars of Austrian history, but is certainly not an improbable one.58 
What decided the issue in any case was that the Schutzbund, weakened as it was by 
mass unemployment, the political retreat of the party leadership, and by being 
banned for almost eleven months, was bound to be defeated, if attacked jointly by 
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the executive and the Heimwehr, even if circumstances had been a little more fa-
vourable.59 
If the Heimwehr from time to time showed signs of recoiling from the use of the 
most brutal means of violence, this was not the case with the National Socialists, 
who proclaimed and practised ‘ruthless violence against bestial terror,’60 both to-
wards ‘Marxists’ and Jews. And it was National Socialism, too, which produced the 
greatest variety in the forms and strategies of violence. 
It was also the one political alignment which unreservedly proclaimed the use of 
individual terror for the realisation of its political aims, irrespective of what their 
party leaders at home and abroad declared. The fascists’ very personalised perception 
of politics did, in effect, lead them to hope for profound political changes from their 
scarcely concealed calls to assassinate Social Democrat party leaders, Jewish authors 
or politicians and even Christian-Socialist Chancellors. As early as March 1925, a 
lone operator was to obey this call and carry out such an attempt, without implicat-
ing his party by having any direct accessory or collaborator. Thus from 1924 on-
wards, a full-blown murder campaign was conducted by the entire völkisch press, 
finding expression in the attempted assassination of Seipel, disguised as a carnival 
joke, by a Nazi gym-teacher from Vienna, Kaspar Hellering, as well as in murder-
ous attempts on several Social Democrat politicians and the Jewish writer Hugo 
Bettauer. The latter eventually fell victim to a young Nazi who had obeyed the 
injunction. Other assassination attempts, like those on the life of Dollfuß and 
Steidle in the early 1930s, were carried out in a similar manner. 
A strategy of more far-reaching consequence was the National Socialists’ 
‘stormtroop terror.’ This was embarked upon in an unmistakable manner in 1923, 
immediately after Hitler had begun to establish his influence also among Austrian 
National Socialists. The ostensible occasion for implementing this strategy was usual-
ly provided by Nazi rallies in working-class districts; their supposed protection 
against the rising anger of the ‘Marxist’ workers was to be provided by armed and 
partly uniformed gangs, who were not registered with the authorities. The resulting 
(unequal) clashes were thus part of a carefully worked out programme. The middle-
class Neue Freie Presse reported such incidents as follows: 
The particular characteristic of these incidents in the outer districts (of Vienna) is 
that the National Socialists seek to penetrate the Social Democrats’ headquarters 
[...] Tactics of such extreme boldness were bound to be regarded as a provocation 
and it was only to be expected that daring ruses of this kind would elicit an even 
fiercer response, and that in the face of this kind of offensive a counter-offensive is 
being taken.61 
What the instructions were which prepared these ‘disciplinary units,’ the Va-
terländische Schutzbund (the patriotic defence league) and later the SA for their 
tasks, can be gleaned from National Socialist newspaper articles, amounting to a 
veiled call to murder: 
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Instead of waiting until a Jewish hireling, under the protection of darkness, bashes 
my head in with a cudgel or sticks a knife between my ribs, I prefer to shoot, and 
shoot as long as my bullets last. A life for a life. If my life is to end, so and so 
many of my attackers will have to go with me.62 
The function of this strategy of violence, within the framework of the National 
Socialists’ path to power, may be summarised – just as for other extreme right-wing 
organisations of the 1920s – as follows: 
Demonstrative rallies and the display of large forces of right-wing paramilitary 
organisations in known ‘Marxist’ working-class districts, deliberately incurring the 
risk of armed clashes, were not primarily designed to smash and repress the opposi-
tion’s organisations. This had been the case in the squadrist terror of Italian Fas-
cism, where fascist militias would be gathered from a whole district to raid a single 
target – a tactic which turned them into a power factor against Social Democrats 
and Communists.63 In Austria, the strength of the ‘anti-Marxist’ combat formations 
was inadequate for this kind of action, particularly in the eastern part of the country, 
nor was the Austrian state apparatus corrupted and weakened to the same degree as 
the Italian one in 1921/22. The strategy of early fascist and reactionary groups, 
particularly in Vienna, was thus many-layered. 
If a demonstrative meeting in a ‘red stronghold’ went off without disturbance, it 
could be used for propaganda (and financial) purposes, since it gave proof of 
strength both to their own rank and file and to the middle-class in general, who still 
feared the extra-parliamentary power of the Social Democrats and considered them 
to be revolutionary. 
If, however, demonstrative actions provoked the ‘Marxist’ workers into disrupt-
ing the meetings and into physical attacks which eventually ended in bloodshed, 
with the greater number of casualties on the Left-attacks, moreover, for which the 
fascist gangs were well prepared – the expected impact was twofold: on the one 
hand it would serve to intimidate vacillating groups among the Social Democrats, 
and on the other it would prove once again to the bourgeois power elites and elec-
torate how dangerous the ‘Marxists’ were, against whom the fascist cadres had 
merely acted in ‘self-defence’ – and thus offer themselves as the most effective 
instrument against the Left. 
In 1933, when the National Socialists had shifted their main line of attack from 
‘Marxism’ to the ‘authoritarian system,’ composed of Catholic-conservative Heim-
wehr-fascists, the fragmented strategies of Nazi propaganda and violence were 
integrated into a single violent strategy for the seizure of power. The outbreaks of 
week-long waves of terror (by bomb attempts, assassinations, the explosion of 
blank shells, clashes), directed and sustained from Germany, signalled the last 
phase before an attempt was made to overthrow the government. A staged plan, 
decided on during a secret conference of Nazi party leaders in Linz on 6 December 
1932, envisaged the following steps: 
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1) Small-scale street terror against anything that stands for black-and-yellow in 
word, print or picture. 
2) Disruption of all meetings and conferences of this nature. 
3) To increase the emotional turbulence until conditions are ripe for ‘everything.’ 
4) A call to all would-be suicides, that if they wanted to die to choose a hero‘s 
death, taking with them a few of those responsible for their distress. Provided 
this propaganda is skilfully handled, the persons who should be the targets can 
be nicely pushed into the foreground. 
5) To blow up goods trains, for instance of wine or industrial products.64 
The object of these violent measures was to strike a death blow at an Austria al-
ready hard hit by the world slump and to combine this with external economic 
measures on the part of the German Reich (the 1000-Mark limit): ‘The present 
government must not be allowed a quiet moment.’65 
In the event, this strategy failed to achieve complete success, as did the attempt-
ed putsch of 25 July 1934. It was only the combination of three very different strat-
egies for the seizure of power – the infiltration of government and adminstrative 
posts from the inside, the generation of pressure from below by relatively non-
violent street demonstrations, but most of all the military intervention from outside 
– which eventually brought the National Socialists to power in March 1938.66 
5.  Social Causes of Political Violence 
The emphasis placed, so far, on the element of strategy and tactics might suggest 
that the acts of political violence which occurred in the First Republic can be ade-
quately explained by the processes of political and strategic decision-making within 
organisations and groups capable of exercising power. In order to correct this im-
pression, the following analysis of the causes of violence, by way of conclusion, 
deals with these in macro-historical terms. 
In the process of transition from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly 
industrial society, the First Republic occupied an interim position.67 Transitional 
stages of this kind tend to be characterised by an uneven growth (or decline) of 
individual sectors of the economy, by concentration in the structure of ownership, 
and by changes in the distribution of incomes, etc.; they are frequently marked also 
by great social tensions, political instability and a high level of violence. Highly 
developed as well as completely traditional countries, on the other hand, tend to-
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wards political stability and a low level of violence.68 Social change, particularly if 
it takes place abruptly or is interrupted – which is the case in most societies at an 
intermediate level of development – may cause great socio-psychological and polit-
ical tensions; in this connection the determining role in the shaping of political 
attitudes has been ascribed to ‘relative deprivation.’69 The high level of violence in 
the Austria of the inter-war period, compared with the last decades of the Habsburg 
monarchy and the Second Republic, may thus be linked to the country’s accelerated 
process of modernisation that had already begun at the turn of the century. 
If the revolutionary changes, both national and social, which the years 1918/19 
had brought in the former empire were partly also a phenomenon of a critical transi-
tional phase in the process of modernisation, the ‘Austrian revolution,’ in its turn, 
provided a further element to heighten the conflict. Especially the (not unnatural) 
absence of consensus as to the structure of state and society resulted in the recently 
established political and social system being called into question – by the Left, for 
whom the revolutionary and evolutionary changes since the Great War had not been 
radical enough, and by the various groups of the Right, because these changes had 
gone much too far. This explains the attempt, made early on, by the large socio-
political groupings to create their own armed formations and to arrogate themselves 
the right to use violence. The fact that they achieved this to a disastrous degree 
reflects the weakness of the young state, which in addition was being restricted by 
the peace treaties. For this reason, the representatives of the state, both middle-class 
and Social Democratic politicians, were neither able nor willing to prevent the 
accumulation and distribution of weapons left over by the World War. 
A further factor in the fostering of violence, equally a result of the War, was that 
the veterans of this war as well as the rising generation had grown accustomed to the 
use of violence.70 The greater inclination to employ violent means, the ‘front spirit,’ 
played an important role throughout the First Republic when it came to giving violent 
expression to political and social discontent and tensions. 
From an historical point of view, next to these long-term or constant causes of 
violence – their list might be even further extended – the medium-term causes of 
violence possess an even greater explanatory value. These concern the worsening, 
over a period of months or a few years, of economic or social conditions. There is 
no doubt that cyclical downswings, in the short term, produced both an increased 
degree of social discontent and a greater inclination to use violence. During the 
democratic phase of the First Republic – which is, strictly speaking, our subject 
here – periods of economic growth went hand in hand with low annual figures for 
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the casualties of violence, unless there were strikes.71 Conversely, any decline in 
GNP was accompanied by an increase in political violence (see Figure 1). 
In all this, unemployment must be regarded as the key factor in transposing the 
area of conflict from the industrial-economic sphere to the extra-parliamentary 
political level (Pearson’s correlation coefficient with violence: 0.40). For hundreds 
of thousands, a long-term and hopeless unemployment situation was the experience 
which, directly or indirectly, shaped their attitudes, mobilising politically those who 
had not yet suffered this fate, inclining them more towards the use of violence, 
while the unemployed tended to be depoliticised by it and alienated from the tradi-
tional Social Democratic workers’ organisations, which had been opposed to vio-
lence.72 This in turn explains the large percentage of unemployed in the paramili-
tary organisations of all political persuasions. 
The link with unemployment appears significant in another respect as well: its 
negative effect both on the attitude to strikes and on trade unions may have blocked 
the settlement of primarily economic conflicts within the orderly confines of labour 
relations, and may thus have banked up a conflict potential on the economic level 
which spilled over into the political one. And it is this which, arguably, was the 
cause of the particular ferocity with which violent political conflicts were fought 
out in the First Republic. 
The fact that in the First Republic, unemployment was of such long duration and 
made more acute because the slump caused by the world economic crisis further 
exacerbated an already high degree of long-term, structural unemployment,73 plays 
a significant part in accounting for the casualty figures of violence. If one examines 
the degree to which violence was determined by the time lag between economic 
growth and a reduction in unemployment, one finds that a one-year time lag alone 
accounted for 20 per cent of the total violence.74 
It is therefore only to be expected that political violence cannot be accounted for 
in purely economic or social terms. A quantitative explanatory model that would 
also include the organisational strength of the parties in the conflict might lead us in 
many respects into the area of political explanations. The numerical strength of 
political organisations engaged in hostilities and violence by itself played an im-
portant, albeit quantitatively not yet ascertainable, role. The aspect of the ratio of 
organisational strength must come into any explanation of the reasons why, in the 
First Republic, the statistical incidence of violence was subject to considerable 
annual fluctuations. This leads to the conclusion that a high incidence of political 
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violence weakened the material and organisational potential of one of the parties to 
the conflict – the loser – to such a degree that the avoidance of political violence in 
the immediately following period became likely. 
Perhaps even more important for the exercise of political violence in the First 
Republic, was the impact of the state’s forces of repression. As has been mentioned 
before, a large percentage of the victims of violence was accounted for by the fact 
that – whenever the executive was involved in violent conflicts, which tended to 
happen somewhat automatically if these were on any scale75 – police and army 
were more effectively armed and possessed superior organisation and direction. 
Probably the most significant cause of political violence was that its very pres-
ence in political conflicts dragged the state’s apparatus of coercion into the struggle, 
even if originally the executive had not been involved. This produced – as long as 
conflict potential existed within society and the necessary organisational preconditions 
were present – a tendency for the interplay of violence and counter-violence to esca-
late to dimensions approaching civil war. (For this reason, the statistical analyses 
given here in summarised form, do not use the crude data of the annual casualty fig-
ures, but their decadic logarithm, increased by a factor of 1).76 
A quantitative explanatory model, certainly still incomplete, for the incidence of 
political violence in a particular year (Ot) in terms of economic growth (Gt-1), unem-
ployment (Ut-1), incidence of violence (Ot-1) in the previous year and intervention by 
the executive (Et) in the following multiple regression equation accounts for 82 per 
cent of the overall fluctuation of casualty figures: 
Ot = 0.78 - 0.007 Gt-1 + 0.104Ut-1 – 0.136Ot-1 + 0.86 Et 
While change in economic growth compared to the previous year does not produce 
a direct effect – albeit an indirect one by way of unemployment – the previous 
year’s unemployment rate constitutes by far the most significant single cause of 
violence. A positive casual effect on the incidence of violence in a particular year of 
roughly half this size is dependent upon whether or not the state executive was 
involved on a major scale in a violent conflict. At the same time, however, a high 
incidence of violence in the previous year – by weakening the violence potential – 
inhibits the tendency towards a renewed, equally strong outbreak of violence. 
 
  
                                                             
75  Cf. also Ch. Tilly, 1975, Revolution and Collective Violence, in Handbook of Political Science, 
vol. 3, ed. F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, 515, Reading, MA. 
76  The quantitative values used here are given in the Table 3. Sources for them in Botz, 
Politische Gewalt, 261 et seq., notes 7-9. 
HSR Suppl. 28 (2016)  │  159 
Table 3: Casualties of Violence, Economic Growth and Unemployment in Austria, 
1919-34 (Values of the Variables of the Regression Equation) 
Year 
Casualties of 
violence 
(deaths and 
serious 
injuries) 
Log. of 
casualty 
figures 
increased by a 
factor of 1 
Growth of 
GNP in real 
terms, in % 
compared to 
previous year 
(=100) 
Unemployment 
rate (as % of 
labour force) 
Strong 
involvement 
by executive 
(more than 1 
death on the 
govt. side = 1, 
otherwise = 0) 
1919  124 2.097   0.1   9.2 1 
1920   76 1.866   6.9   2.0 1 
1921    2 0.477  10.7   1.4 0 
1922    5 0.778   9.0   3.4 0 
1923   22 1.362  -1.1   6.6 0 
1924   10 1.041 11.7   5.8 0 
1925    8 0.954   6.8   7.9 0 
1926    0 0.0   1.6   9.4 0 
1927  274 2.439   3.1   9.2 1 
1928    8 0.954   4.6   8.5 0 
1929   77 1.892   1.5   8.9 0 
1930   40 1.613  -2.8 11.2 0 
1931   27 1.447  -8.0 14.2 0 
1932  104 2.021 -10.3 18.3 0 
1933   69 1.845  -3.3 20.3 0 
1934 1932 3.286   0.8 18.8 1 
 
